Loyalty, or in other words, faithfulness is one of the main themes of both Tolkien’s Middle-earth novels The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings. Undoubtedly, one of the main constituents of loyalty is solidarity based on personal inclination. However, for Tolkien, obedience to the objective moral right is a more important condition of loyalty than solidarity. This aspect of his depiction of loyalty was analyzed by Dickerson (125-6). He claims that the virtue of loyalty in his stories is always tied to a sense of moral duty rather than mere love, and he illustrates his point on Bilbo’s sense of duty towards the dwarves. Comparably, the central element of The Lord of the Rings is Sam’s loyalty to Frodo. They both had a number of opportunities to leave their companions, turn back from their journey and go home or stay in some comfortable place they passed through (for example, Bilbo after escaping from the goblin caves or after trading the Arkenstone with the Elves; Sam after his first meeting with the Elves, in Rivendell, Lórien, or at Amon Hen), but they did not do so because they knew that it is not right to abandon a friend in need. They remain loyal because they feel a certain moral responsibility arising from the mere fact of them taking up the quest as well as their mutual relationship.
Dickerson observes that many readers would disagree with the idea that the characters’ loyalty is based rather on their sense of duty and would think it hypocritical to do so just because it is the morally right thing, but their actions are not in unity with their real feelings. The argument is that Bilbo did not want to go back to the goblin caves to look for the dwarves (while he should have been happy to do so if he had genuinely cared for them), but he was convinced he had to do so because his position required him to do it. Dickerson objects that this shows that his desire to do the good thing is greater than his desire to be comfortable. So, he basically sacrifices himself for the well-being of his fellows and that is a good enough proof that he already loved them, even though he did not realize that fact at the time, according to the Christian belief that there is no greater expression of love than self-sacrifice. Even Tolkien (2006, 393) himself stated in one of his letters that loyalty “indeed only becomes a virtue when one is under pressure to desert it.”
An adjacent virtue to loyalty is truthfulness – holding true to one’s promises to others. If Dickerson had referred to the two examples of truthfulness he mentioned elsewhere in his book, these could be more convincing of the greater virtuosity of loyalty based on moral responsibility than that based on personal attraction only. One of the two cases is Frodo’s loyalty to Gollum. He disliked and pitied the loathsome creature; nonetheless, he felt he was betraying him when he lured him out of the Forbidden Pool just to be captured by Faramir’s men. The second case is Faramir’s understanding of truthfulness. He voiced what Frodo felt: it is morally evil to break one’s troth (or counsel someone to do so) or to snare even an enemy with a falsehood (Tolkien, 2011b, 692, 664). Faramir could have taken advantage of Frodo, who was just a stranger to him, and Frodo, in turn, could have cared less about Gollum, who was incurably wicked, but neither of them broke the loyalty to their chance acquaintance because, as Dickerson (72) put it, they believed that it is not right to “abandon the moral good for the sake of personal safety,” or enrichment.
Smith and Kreeft also discussed Faramir’s trustworthiness. Smith notes that trustworthiness requires stern character, but seeing fellows struggle under it can move one to pity and then they may fall to the temptation to advise them to break their promises and abandon their road. Smith contrasts Faramir’s faithfulness to Gollum’s. Gollum wishes to be worthy of Frodo’s trust partly because Frodo is the only person who really cares about him. But the greater part of him just wants to trick the hobbits into believing he is a trustworthy guide so that he could lead them to a trap.
Kreeft, in comparison, operates with the term emeth, a Hebrew word meaning the truth of a person’s thought, deed, and character, which, in his opinion, is a precondition to all virtue. He, too, compares Faramir to Boromir, who broke his vow to protect the Ringbearer, and also to Gollum, who according to him completely lacks emeth. He is unable to hold a promise because he lacks personal integrity (the stern character) as is manifested by his addressing himself in first person plural or third person singular rather than “I”.
On the whole, promise-making is a fundamental element of social stability (being the root of all law). But it is also very dangerous. Tolkien, in the character of Elrond, warns us that a thoughtless promise may break one’s spirit, if this is not strong enough, even though some could expect it to fasten it (Tolkien, 2011b, 281).
Another virtue that goes hand in hand with loyalty is obedience – not a blind following of one’s superiors but a reverence to the objective good. Obedience is the manifestation of humility but it has to be exercised with prudential wisdom. As Smith explains, orcs, too, are obedient of the Dark Lord’s commands, but obedience of evil is not virtuous. On the other hand, the negative effect of disobeying one’s superior is diminished if this is done for the sake of some higher good, as was the case with Beregond, who left his post on the guard and fought in a sacred place in order to save Faramir. His breaking the law was not entirely pardoned on account of the usefulness of his deed, but his punishment was not so severe.
Kreeft’s approach to this virtue is different. His interpretation is more religious; he understands it as a submission to Providence. According to him, everyone has some God-given life quest (some would call it fate), which is rarely identical to our dreams of ideal life. Upon discovering this, it is up to our free will to conform to it or refuse it and thus implicitly refuse God (Kreeft 204). This touches on the Biblical idea that the fulfilment of life consists in carrying out God’s will. The best example is Frodo, whom Kreeft likens to Saint Mary the mother of Christ — he would have, and could have, stayed in Rivendell and resumed his comfortable life, but he slowly realized that he was appointed to destroy the Ring by some higher power and this is the purpose of his life.
- Sam too felt a certain duty to stay at Frodo’s side. Note his words: “I have something to do before the end, and it lies ahead, not in the Shire. I must see it through, sir, if you understand me.” (Tolkien, 2011b, 87)
- Sam is an exception to this, because he loved Frodo more than Bilbo did the dwarves, since for him it was all just a matter of a business contract for almost half of their journey.
- 3. Compare John 15:13: “Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.”
Works Cited
- Dickerson, M., Following Gandalf: Epic Battles and Moral Victory in the Lord of the Rings, Ada: Brazos Press, 2003.
- Kreeft, P., The Philosophy of Tolkien: The Worldview Behind the Lord of the Rings, Ignatius Press, 2005.
- Smith, M. E., Tolkien’s Ordinary Virtues, Westmont: InterVarsity Press, 2002.
- Tolkien, J.R.R., The Hobbit, 2011a, London: HarperCollins, 1937.
- Tolkien, J.R.R., The Lord of the Rings, 2011b, London: HarperCollins, 1954.
- Tolkien, J.R.R., The Silmarillion, 1992, London: HarperCollins, 1977.
- Tolkien, J.R.R.; Carpenter, H. (ed.), The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, 2006, London: HarperCollins, 1981.